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Abstract
Two types of framework are distinguished regarding the nature of
logic and the logical analysis of natural language. In the rst, logic
is a calculus subject to varying set-theoretic interpretations over do-
mains of varying cardinality, and in this sense is based on a theory of
membership in a set. This type need not restrict its analyses of nat-
ural language to extensional discourse only; e.g., Richard Montagues
sense-denotation intensional logic, which has been used to provide
analyses of intensional discourse, is really a type-theoretical set the-
ory supplemented with a theory of senses. The analyses this type of
framework provides are not entirely satisfactory, however, for reasons
related to the way that intensional entities are analyzed in terms of
membership in a set. The second type of framework, where logical
forms are semantic structures in their own right, is based on pred-
ication as described in a formal theory of universals. This type of
framework: gives a more adequate analysis of natural language and
can be developed in a type-free way without generating the logical
antinomies. Also, because a set-theoretic semantics provides only an
extrinsic characterization of validity for this type of framework, such
a semantics cannot be used to show that the laws of logic of this type
of framework must be essentially incomplete.
There are two major doctrines regarding the nature of logic today. The
rst is the view of logic as the laws of valid deductive inference, i.e., logic
as calculus. This view began with Aristotles theory of the syllogism, or
syllogistic logic, and in time evolved rst into Booles algebra of logic and then
into quanticational logic. On this view, logic is an abstract calculus capable
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of various interpretations over domains of varying cardinality. Because these
interpretations are given in terms of a set-theoretic semantics where one can
vary the universe at will and consider the e¤ect this has on the validity of
formulas, this view is sometimes described as the set-theoretic approach to
logic (see van Heijenoort 1967, p. 327).
The second view of logic does not eschew set-theoretic semantics, and
it may in fact utilize such a semantics as a guide in the determination of
validity. But to use such a semantics as a guide, on this view, is not the
same as to take that semantics as an essential characterization of validity.
Indeed, unlike the view of logic as calculus, this view of logic rejects the
claim that a set-theoretic denition of validity has anything other than an
extrinsic signicance that may be exploited for certain purposes (such as
proving a completeness theorem). Instead, on this view, logic has content in
its own right and validity is determined by what are called the laws of logic,
which may be stated either as principles or as rules. Because one of the
goals of this view is a specication of the basic laws of logic from which the
others may be derived, this view is sometimes called the axiomatic approach
to logic.
There is no uniformity among the advocates of either view of logic as to
what theory of logical form should be taken as a denitive system of logic.
First-order logic, for example, can be the favored system for an advocate of
either view; but then so might a form of higher-order logic as well. Even
the distinction between intensional and extensional logic, as we will see, fails
to mark a clear line between the two views. A set-theoretic semantics for
intensional logic is also called possible-worlds semantics. In this paper we
will be concerned only with one or another version of intensional logic as a
way of explaining the distinction between these two views of logic.
The main problem for the axiomatic approach is whether or not there can
be a complete, recursive axiomatization of the laws of logic of a given theory
of logical form. When the answer is a¢ rmative, a set-theoretic semantics
may help in establishing that fact; but in that case, on the view of logic
in question, the completeness theorem we establish in terms of such a set-
theoretic semantics is deprived of sense ... by the very use we make of it.
It is a case, in Wittgensteins gure, of kicking away the ladder by which we
have climbed(Quine 1968, p. 297). The possibility of a negative answer,
however, is another matter altogether, and it is one of the problems we shall
consider in this paper.
The historical antecedent of the second view of logic, incidentally, was
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Leibnizs somewhat visionary goal of a lingua philosophica or characteristica
universalis. For Frege this goal meant the construction of a logically perfect
languagethat was not only complete with respect to the laws of valid infer-
ence but which also would enable us to give a conceptual or logical analysis
of the di¤erent possible statements we might make and to which such laws
might apply. Instead of logic being an abstract calculus subject to varying
interpretations, logic on this view has content of its own and is a language in
its own right. That is why this approach is sometimes described as the view
of logic as language (see van Heijenoort 1967, pp. 324-30).
This is not to say that all content on this view of logic is logical con-
tent, i.e., content expressible in purely logical terms. Rather, the nonlogical
content that can be expressed in a such a logically perfect language is really
content that can be expressed in an applied form of the theory of logical
form characterizing the logico-grammatical structure of that language. In
this regard, the language in the idea of logic as language is not intended as a
substitute for natural language so much as a way of providing a semantics for
natural language. Applied logical forms, in other words, are really semantic
structures in their own right, and it is by assigning such logical forms to
the expressions of a natural language that one provides an interpretation or
semantics for those expressions. Such an assignment amounts, on this view,
to a conceptual or logical analysis of those expressions. That is why an ad-
vocate of this view might well consider an applied theory of logical form as
a lingua philosophica.
In contrast, applied logical forms on the view of logic as calculus have no
more semantic content of their own than do unapplied logical forms. Both
are merely expressions of an abstract calculus, and any content they might
otherwise be taken as having is a matter of an external set-theoretical se-
mantics. In this regard, the real contrast between logic as calculus and logic
as language is more appropriately seen as a contrast between the external
set-theoretical semantics underlying an applied system of logic as an abstract
calculus and the internal semantics expressed in the logical forms of that sys-
tem as a language in its own right. This contrast, I believe, can ultimately
be best explained in terms of the di¤erence between a theory of membership
in a set on the one hand and a theory of predication on the other.
On the view of logic as language, the most fundamental of all logical forms
are the forms of predication, since these are the forms that underlie any pos-
sible assertion that we might make in language. Indeed, so fundamental are
these forms on the view in question that di¤erent theories of logical form as
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alternative accounts of logic as language are for the most part really based
on alternative theories of predication. In the history of philosophy, these al-
ternative theories have generally been presented as theories of universals, the
three most prominant being nominalism, conceptualism and realism. This
is because on each of these theories a universal is that which can be pred-
icated of things, and in fact it is the predicable nature of a universal that
constitutes its universality. Sets, it should be noted, are not universals in
this sense, though of course they are abstract entities; but being an abstract
entity is not the same as being a universal.
We will not go into the formal di¤erences between di¤erent theories of
universals here, having already covered that ground in my 1986 book and my
1988 article. Nevertheless, we do note that insofar as a theory of logical form
is based on a formal theory of predication, which in turn is associated with
a theory of universals, then, on the logic as language view of logical forms
as semantic structures in their own right, we may take that theory of logical
form as being itself the explanation that its associated theory of universals
purports to give of the predicable nature of universals, i.e., of that in which
the universality of universals consists. In this regard, we maintain in what
follows that what distinguishes the view of logic as language from that of
logic as calculus is that on the former logic is based on a formal theory of
predication, whereas on the latter it is based, at least semantically, on mem-
bership in a set. This is because on the latter view validity is characterized
essentially in terms of a set-theoretic semantics, whereas on the view of logic
as language validity is a matter of the laws of logic that are expressed in
terms of the theory of logical form in question. This di¤erence, as we shall
see, is not unrelated to the problem of the possible incompleteness of a given
theory of logical form.
On the set-theoretic approach, predication is interpreted in terms of mem-
bership, and not membership in terms of predication. Predication, in other
words, has no real signicance on this approach over and above its analysis
in terms of membership in a set. This is true, moreover, not just for the
forms of predication of a logical calculus but for those of natural language as
well. That is, one can give a set-theoretic semantics for a recursively specied
natural language just as one can for a logical calculus. On the set-theoretic
approach, accordingly, there is no need for a theory of logical form as an
explanation of the predicable nature of universals, because predication on
this approach is ultimately to be analyzed in terms of membership. This
suggests that set theory can itself be taken as a lingua philosophica or frame-
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work within which philosophical analyses can be given; and indeed that is
the point of our claim that the real contrast between logic as calculus and
logic as language is between a theory of membership in a set and a theory
of predication. The problem here, however, is whether any analysis of pred-
ication in terms of membership is really adequate, or whether there really is
something to the idea of logical forms, especially those regarding predication,
as semantic structures underlying the expressions of natural language.
1 The Problem with a Set-Theoretic
Semantics of Natural Language
A good example of the supposed superuous role of logical forms as seman-
tic structures of the sentences of natural language is Montagues English
as a Formal Language[EFL]. Here Montague uses set theory to construct
the syntax and semantics of a fragment of English in a way that resembles
the construction in set theory of the syntax and semantics of a rst-order
modal predicate calculus. For example, syntactic categories are recursively
dened for this fragment of English in terms of certain basic expressions of
those categories and a system of grammatical rules that generates complex
expressions from simpler ones. An expression that belongs to any one of
these categories is a meaningful expression of English, and as such it is called
a denotingexpression of its respective category. The meaning of such an
expression in any model for the fragment, in other words, will be the deno-
tation it is assigned in such a model (relative to an assignment of values to
variables).
A model in Montagues semantics for his fragment of English is a set-
theoretic structure consisting of what we are to think of as a set of possible
individuals, a set of possible worlds, and certain functions dened on these
sets assigning appropriate types of denotations (relative to an assignment of
values to the variables) to the basic expressions of the syntactic categories of
that fragment. Of course, the goal of the semantics is to assign denotations
to all of the meaningful expressions, and not just to the basic ones. But
unlike the situation in the predicate calculus, some denoting expressions are
ambiguous in that they can be built up from the basic ones in several di¤erent
ways on the basis of the grammatical rules. This is as it should be, of course,
because the point is to formalize a fragment of a natural language where such
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ambiguity is common. Montague overcomes this problem by rst associating
a tree-structure with a denoting expression that provides an analysis of how
that expression is generated. Ambiguous expressions will then be assigned
more than one tree-structure. The denotation of a denoting expression will
be determined then not just relative to a model and an assignment of values
to variables, but to a tree-structure analysis of that expression as well. The
result is a semantical analysis within set theory of both ambiguity and the
relation of logical consequence for the fragment of English in question.
Now there are certain important assumptions in Montagues approach in
English as a Formal Languagethat may be challenged. One such assump-
tion, for example, is that the construction of syntax and semantics must
proceed hand in hand ([EFL], p. 210) and that the basic goal of serious
syntax and semantics is the construction of a theory of truth (see Moravcsik
1979, pp. 3-15, for a criticism of this assumption). Another is Montagues
use of Freges principle of compositionality, e.g., that truth-values are to be
assigned to sentences by assigning extra-linguistic entities to all of the expres-
sions involved in the generation of those sentences, and in such a way that
the assignment to a compound will be a function of the entities assigned to
its components([EFL], p. 217; see Hintikka 1980 and 1981, section 6, for
criticism of this assumption). We will not take up these assumptions here
ourselves, however, but will instead consider Montagues use of set theory
as a theoretical framework in which to analyze such intensional entities as
propositions, properties and relations in intension as these are normally ex-
pressed in natural language. For the idea that such analyses can be given
amounts in e¤ect to the claim that set theory can be used as a lingua philo-
sophica; and indeed Montague was at one time quite clear that that was in
fact his goal.
Philosophy, on this view, has as its proper theoretical framework set the-
ory with individuals and the possible addition of empirical predicates(On
the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities [PE], p. 154). Philosophical
analyses, in other words, are to be carried out as denitional extensions of
set theory, supplemented when needed with empirical predicates and individ-
uals as concrete urelements. In particular, Montagues formalization of the
syntax and semantics of a fragment of English is really an analysis carried
out by means of a denitional extension of set theory supplemented with the
notions of a possible individual and a possible world. On this analysis, where
A is the set of possible individuals and I is the set of possible worlds of a
model, the set of propositions or possible denotations of formulas is dened
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as the set U1 = f0; 1gI , i.e., as the set of functions from possible worlds to
truth-values (where 0 represents falsehood and 1 represents truth). Similarly,
the set of properties or possible denotations of one-place predicates and the
set of two-place relations-in-intension are dened as the sets U2 = UA1 and
U3 = U
AA
1 , respectively.
Now the question that arises here is how seriously are we to take these
denitions? In particular, do propositions, properties and relations in inten-
sion really have the kind of dependence on the sets of possible individuals
and possible worlds they are assumed to have on Montagues analysis? One
consequence of this analysis, for example, is that properties and relations-in-
intension are identical if they have the same extension in every possible world
(of a given model), and similarly, that propositions are identical if they have
the same truthvalue in every possible world. This means, as Montague him-
self noted, that if ' and  are logically equivalent sentences (with respect
to given analyses f and g), then John believes that 'and John believes
that will turn out also to be logically equivalent (with respect to analyses
that contain f and g as parts)([EFL], p. 218). This leads to what Hintikka
has called the problem of logical omniscience, i.e., the problem of believing
or knowing all of the logical consequences of what one believes or knows,
respectively.
We can avoid this consequence, as Montague does in Universal Gram-
mar[UG], by distinguishing between designated and undesignated possible
worlds (of a given model), where in the latter logical constants can be given
nonstandard interpretations. The logical equivalence of two expressions will
then depend only on the extensions they have in designated worlds, while
synonymy will depend on the extensions they have in the nondesignated
worlds as well (cf. [UG], p. 231). Of course this assumes that some account
can be given in purely set-theoretical terms of the distinction between desig-
nated and undesignated possible worlds (or of designated and undesignated
contexts of use within possible worlds).
But even aside from assuming a new and unexplained distinction between
designated and undesignated possible worlds there still remains the problem
of the individuation of propositions, properties and relations-in-intension in
terms of the sets of possible individuals and possible worlds of a given model.
For this means that within set theory as a purported lingua philosophica it
is meaningless to talk about the same proposition, property or relation-in-
intension across models that di¤er, however trivially, in their sets of possible
individuals or possible worlds. Certainly, this sort of dependence is contrary
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to the way intensional entities are represented in natural language. In par-
ticular, just as properties are not individuated in terms of their instances,
they are also not ordinarily thought of as being individuated in terms of the
instances they have in di¤erent possible worlds, designated or undesignated;
and the idea that we cannot meaningfully speak of the same property as
being represented in di¤erent models indicates that something is radically
wrong with a set-theoretical analysis of properties.
Of course, much depends here on how we are to understand the notions
of a possible world and a possible individual. Montague himself only asked
that we think of two of the constituents of a model as the sets of possible
individuals and possible worlds of that model (cf. [EFL], p. 192); but in
doing so he implicitly assumed that we understand the notions of a possible
world and possible individual. In order to be articulated, however, such an
understanding would seem to presuppose a modal or intensional logic either
as an adjunct to set theory itself or as a superseding theory of predication
in which membership is no longer a fundamental or primitive concept. In
either case, set theory, or a theory of membership alone, will not su¢ ce as
a theoretical framework for philosophy, or at least not for a philosophy that
purports to provide a semantics for natural language. Whatever its merits
as a mathesis universalis, set theory, or a theory of membership alone, does
not su¢ ce as a lingua philosophica.
2 Intensional Logic as a New Theoretical
Framework for Philosophy
Montague did not himself remain satised with set theory as a lingua philo-
sophica, and in the end he proposed instead the construction of an intensional
logic as a new theoretical framework within which to carry out philosophical
analyses. Thus, according to Montague, philosophy is always capable of
enlarging itself; that is, by metamathematical or model-theoretic means
means available within set theory one can justify a language or theory
that transcends set theory, and then proceed to transact a new branch of
philosophy within the new language. It is now time to take such a step and
to lay the foundations of intensional languages([PE), p. 155).
Actually Montague went on to construct not one but two intensional log-
ics, but only the rst is a theory of logical form in the traditional sense of
8
being based on predication. This was Montagues higher-order modal pred-
icate logic, which he originally described as a second-order predicate logic
with third-order predicate constants, but which can be easily extended to
include predicate expressions of all nite orders (as is done in Gallin (1975,
chap. 3), and as we will assume it to be here). Montagues second intensional
logic, on the other hand, is really a type-theoretical set theory where sets are
represented by their characteristic functions, but extended so as to include
a theory of senses as well.That is, where F is the characteristic function of
a set A, i.e., a function from objects to truth-values (members of f0; 1g),
then F (x) = 1, which in Montagues second intensional logic is written as
F (x), means the same thing as x 2 A. Thus, instead of being based on pred-
ication, Montagues second intensional logic is really based on membership
(as represented by the characteristic function of a set). The distinction may
seem unimportant (and we will not be concerned with it in this section),
but, in fact, as we shall argue later, it goes to the very heart of the matter of
the di¤erence between logic as calculus and logic as language. For now, we
want only to claim that the di¤erence between logic as calculus and logic as
language applies as much to intensional logic as it does to extensional logic.
Montagues own reason for dropping his rst intensional logic in favor of
the second had nothing to do with the di¤erence between logic as calculus
and logic as language. Rather, it was a result of the apparent need in the
application of his rst intensional logic to resort to circumlocution and para-
phrase in the analysis of the intensional verbs of natural language. In the
application of his second intensional logic, in other words, Montague was able
to describe a precise translation function that provided a direct analysis of
intensional verbs, i.e., an analysis that does not resort to circumlocution and
paraphrase. (This may be seen as an argument in favor of the set-theoretical
approach, at least when the latter is extended to include a theory of senses;
for that, as we have said, is what Montagues second intensional logic really
amounts to.)
The problem of translation into a theory of logical form seems to be better
appreciated by linguists than by philosophers. For unlike a set-theoretical
semantics where recursive or e¤ective truth-conditions are given (as transla-
tion rules into set theory) corresponding to the recursive construction of the
syntactic categories of a natural language, the assignment of logical forms
is generally presented as an intuitive process (or as an art that we learn
in elementary logic courses) that depends essentially on circumlocution and
paraphrase. Montague, as noted, relied heavily on such circumlocution in
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the philosophical analyses he gave in his rst intensional logic. For example,
in giving an analysis of
Jones sees a unicorn having the same height as a table actually before him.
that does not involve assuming the existence of sense-data (as some philoso-
phers claim it must), Montague distinguished between seesin its veridical
sense and sees in its nonveridical sense. The latter was paraphrased by
Montague as seems to see, where seemswas analyzed as a three-place
predicate, x seems to y to F. The phrase to Fis taken in this analysis as
an innitive or nominalized predicate occurring as an abstract singular term.
Using -abstracts to represent properties and relations, and as translations of
innitives when occurring in argument positions (where [z']is read to be
a z such that '), we can describe Montagues analysis of the above sentence
as follows:
(9x)[Table(x) ^Before(x; Jones) ^ Seems(Jones; Jones;
[z(9y)(Unicorn(y) ^ Sees(z; y) ^Has-the-same-height-as(y; x)])]:
No sense-data are involved in this analysis, and, according to Montague, an
argument for the existence of sense-data based on the content of the sentence
in question must therefore fail (cf. [PE], p. 171).
As another example of the apparent need for circumlocution, consider
the following two arguments, one of which is clearly valid while the other is
clearly invalid.
Jones nds a unicorn; therefore, there is a unicorn.
Jones seeks a unicorn; therefore, there is a unicorn.
The puzzle here is to explain how of two arguments of apparently the same
logical form one can be valid and the other invalid.
Montagues approach in this example was to regard tries to ndas a
circumlocution for seeks, where the verb triesis analyzed as a two-place
predicate, x tries to F. Again, the phrase to Fin this analysis represents
an innitive or nominalized predicate occurring as an abstract singular term.
Thus, whereas the rst argument is assigned the following logical form,
(9y)[Unicorn(y) ^ Finds(Jones; y)]; therefore; (9y)Unicorn(y);
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which is clearly valid, the second argument is assigned the di¤erent logical
form,
Tries(Jones; [z(9y)(Unicorn(y) ^ Finds(z; y))]);
therefore; (9y)Unicorn(y);
which is not valid. In other words, through circumlocution and paraphrase,
the two arguments can be seen to have di¤erent logical forms after all; and
therefore the validity of the one argument need not carry over to the other.
These analyses, it should be emphasized, occur in Montagues application
of his rst intensional logic, which is really a theory of logical form that is
based on predication. Despite the philosophical usefulness of these analyses,
however, Montague subsequently came not to depend on them. In particular,
Montague became dissatised with the use of circumlocution and paraphrase,
and he came to maintain that nothing short of a rigorous theory of translation
between a natural language and an intensional logic will do before we can
consider the latter as providing the logical forms underlying the expressions
of that natural language. It was for this reason that he constructed his
second intensional logic, which, as we have said, is really a type-theoretical
form of set theory with an adjoined theory of senses. The latter is described
in terms of two new operators ^ and _, called the sense and denotation (or
intension-forming and extension-forming) operators, respectively.
We should keep in mind in this context that natural languages are not to
be distinguished from articial or constructed languages on the grounds that
only the latter have recursively constructed syntactic categories. After all,
a set-theoretic semantics that bypasses the logical forms of intensional logic
is possible for a natural language only by providing grammatical rules that
allow us to recursively construct the syntactic categories of that language.
Indeed, in [UG], Montague formulated a universal grammar whose purpose
was precisely to comprehend the syntax and semantics of both kinds of lan-
guage within a single natural mathematically precise theory(p. 222). As
part of this universal grammar, Montague also formulated a mathematically
precise theory of translation, and as an example of an application of this
theory, he constructed a specic translation function that assigned logical
forms from his second or sense-denotation intensional logic to the expres-
sions of the fragment of English he formulated within his universal grammar.
That is, Montague showed how one can translate a recursively specied nat-
ural language into his sense-denotation intensional logic in no less precise a
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manner than one can translate that language into set theory by means of re-
cursive truth-conditions. In this way, Montague overcame the objection that
one must rely on circumlocution and linguistic intuition in order to associate
logical forms with the expressions of a natural language. Of course, given
a theory of logical form that is proposed as an alternative to Montagues
sense-denotation intensional logic, the objection remains in force unless a
rigorously dened translation function can be dened for that theory as well.
3 The Incompleteness of Intensional Logic
When Based on Membership
According to Montague, the point to a rigorously characterized translation
into intensional logic is that it induces a more perspicuous interpretation
of the expressions of natural language than is possible with a purely set-
theoretic semantics (see [UG], p. 241). Apparently, this is because the logical
forms of intensional logic give a representation of intensional entities that is
both direct and independent of any antecedently given reference to possible
individuals or possible worlds. That, of course, is a claim that is fully con-
sonant with the view of logic as language, and at this point one might even
maintain that Montagues sense-denotation intensional logic is an embodi-
ment of the idea of logic as language. The problem with such a conclusion,
however, is that the logic is essentially incomplete, and this is not unrelated
to the fact that it is based on membership and not on predication.
We must be cautious here in how we are to understand Montagues set-
theoretic semantics for his intensional logic. For Montagues real commit-
ment to possible individuals and possible worlds is not in his set-theoretic
semantics but in the intensional logic that he took to transcend set theory.
This intensional logic is really a type-theoretical form of set theory com-
bined with a theory of senses. Every entity of whatever type, for example, is
taken in this theory as the denotation (or extension) of a sense (or intension),
and properties and relations-in-intension are identied as the senses of sets
and relations-in-extension (as represented by their characteristic functions).
Propositions are similarly identied as the senses of truth-values. Of course,
as objects in their own right (or of their own type), senses are themselves the
denotations of other senses, and consequently there is a whole hierarchy of
senses in this framework as well.
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In this logic possible individuals are simply the objects indicated by bound
occurrences of the individual variables; and that some of these individuals
might not actually exist is seen in the fact that (8x)_E!(x) is not taken
by Montague as valid, where E! stands for the property (or sense) whose
denotation is the set of individuals that exists in the actual world. (The set
that is the denotation of this property is represented by _E!, i.e., by applying
the extension-forming operator to E!.) Montagues commitment to possible
worlds, on the other hand, is really a commitment to what might be called
world-propositions. For example, where P , Q are propositional variables,
the property of being a possible world can be dened as the sense of the set of
those propositions P that can denote truth and such that for any proposition
Q, either P entails Q or P entails the complement of Q:
Poss-Wld =df ^[P (_P ^ (8Q)([_P ! _Q] _[_P ! _:Q]))]:
Using this notion, Montagues commitment to possible worlds can now
be seen in the fact that
(9P )(_Poss-Wld(P ) ^ _P )
is a valid thesis of his intensional logic (see Prior and Fine 1977, for an
analysis of possible worlds as world-propositions).
Now the validity of the above formula is easily seen by returning to Mon-
tagues set-theoretic semantics where relative to certain sets that we are to
think ofas the sets of possible individuals and possible worlds, respectively,
senses of entities of a given type are represented by arbitrary functions from
the set of possible worlds to entities of that type. Propositions are then
represented by functions from possible worlds to truth-values (represented in
turn by the sets 0 and 1), or equivalently by arbitrary sets of possible worlds,
including all unit or singleton sets of possible worlds (or functions that are
true at one and only one possible world). A proposition that is represented
by such a unit set is then a world-propositionin the above sense.
Note that we speak here of propositions being represented by functions
from possible worlds (designated or otherwise) to truth values, and not as
literally being such functions. This is because for an intensionalist possible
worlds are to be analyzed in terms of propositions and not propositions in
terms of possible worlds; and for an advocate of Montagues sense-denotation
intensional logic in particular, possible worlds are world-propositions in the
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above sense. For such an intensionalist, in other words, functions from pos-
sible worlds to truth values can at best be correlated with propositions, not
identied with them.
Of course, such a correlation would still imply that propositions are iden-
tical when they necessarily denote the same truth values, and that result
is problematic. This need not a¤ect the argument for the validity of the
above formula, however, so long as an intensionalist can assume that there
is always at least one (even if not exactly one) proposition corresponding
to each function from possible worlds to truth values. Montague, of course,
made the stronger, more problematic assumption of a one-to-one correlation,
and, indeed, it appears to be this assumption that is the basis of his claim
that we can use set theory to justifyintensional logic as a framework that
transcends set theory itself.
Although Montague assumed that both of his intensional logics tran-
scended set theory, it is really only his sense-denotation intensional logic that
contains a type-theoretical form of set theory in its own right. Montagues
rst intensional logic, as we have said, is really based on predication, and it is
only by interpreting predication in terms of membership that Montague was
able to think of this logic as containing a type-theoretical form of set theory
as well. But an alternative interpretation in which predication is viewed as
more fundamental than membership is also possible, and though the logic
will contain a theory of classes under that interpretation, these classes will
not be sets in the sense of the iterative concept. Indeed, they will instead be
classes in the logical sense of the view of logic as language.
Our present concern, however, is withMontagues second or sense-denotation
intensional logic, one containing a type-theoretical form of set theory in its
own right. This means that a certain necessary condition is imposed on the
set-theoretical semantics for this logic; in particular, that the hierarchy of
sets (or of their characteristic functions) that is part of this semantics is de-
termined by all nite stages of the operation: X ! P(X ), where P(X ) is the
power set of X . Or, in terms of functions, and where a and b are arbitrary
types of the logic, it is the hierarchy determined by the operation that goes
from the universes Ua, Ub of entities of types a and b, respectively (and as
based on given sets of possible individuals and possible worlds), to the set
(Ub)Ua consisting of all functions from Ua into Ub. This is the noncumulative
hierarchy of all nite stages generated by the iterative concept of set, and
as such it is the basis of what are called the standard models or interpre-
tations of higher-order logic; but standard, it should be emphasized, only
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insofar as such a logic is understood as containing a type-theoretical form of
set theory. It is well known that when validity is dened in terms of these
standard models, i.e., as truth in all standard models, the set of formulas
that are thereby determined to be valid is not recursively enumerable. Any
higher-order logic, in other words, that is to be interpreted as containing
a type-theoretical form of the iterative concept of set, such as Montagues
sense-denotation intensional logic in particular, is essentially incomplete.
A logic that is essentially incomplete cannot be taken as an embodiment
of the view of logic as language, or what we have also called the axiomatic
approach; or at least it cannot if the set-theoretic semantics with respect to
which it is incomplete provides an adequate external criterion of validity for
that logic. For in that case, the set-theoretic characterization of validity can-
not be eliminated in favor of an axiomatic characterization; and therefore the
set-theoretic characterization must be seen as providing more than a guide
to validity. This is true, moreover, even when the logic is intended to be
interpreted as transcending set theory, as is the case with Montagues sense-
denotation intensional logic. In other words, the set-theoretic semantics used
to justify this intensional logic in fact provides an essential characteriza-
tion of validity for it; for it is a characterization that cannot be eliminated
by any internal criterion in terms of the so-called laws of that logic. Mon-
tagues set-theoretic justication of his intensional logic does depend on
the problematic assumption that propositions can be adequately represented
by functions from possible worlds to truth values, but even if this assumption
were weakened as indicated above, the logic would still be incomplete, since
it still must be interpreted as containing a type-theoretical form of set theory.
A completeness theorem would be forthcoming, it might be noted, if we
were to reject the restriction to standard models in the characterization of
validity and allow what are called general models as well (see Gallin 1975,
chap. 1, section 3). In that case, the hierarchy of functions need not go from
the universes Ua, Ub of entities of types a and b, respectively, to the set (Ub)Ua
of all functions from Ua into Ub, but only to some nonempty subset of this set
that fullls certain closure conditions. Such an allowance, however, would
amount to rejecting the idea that the logic is to contain a type-theoretical
form of set theory; for it would amount to replacing the type-theoretical
hierarchy of sets by a hierarchy of classes (or of functions) that is based on a
concept other than the iterative concept of set. This latter hierarchy is not
an implausible framework for an intensional logic based on predication, or at
least so we shall subsequently argue, but it is inappropriate for a logic based
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on membership. Redening validity in terms of general models, in other
words, is not a viable alternative for Montagues sense-denotation intensional
logic.
4 Predication Versus Membership in Type
Theory
Both of Montagues intensional logics are theories of logical forms based on
one or another version of type theory. This is understandable for Montagues
rst intensional logic, we maintain, because this logic is based on predication,
but it is not really clear why his second, or sense-denotation, intensional logic,
which is based on membership, should also be restricted to a type-theoretical
theory of logical form. The historical answer as to why one would adopt a
type-theoretical theory of logical form is of course avoidance of Russells
paradox. But in the case of Montagues sense-denotation intensional logic,
this answer is somewhat problematic.
Russells paradox really has two forms, one in regard to the class of all
classes that are not members of themselves, the other in regard to the prop-
erty of being a property that is not a property of itself. Russell himself
avoided the rst form of his paradox by adopting his famous no classes
theory, according to which all talk of classes is reducible to talk about prop-
erties that have those classes as their extensions. He then avoided the second
form by imposing type-theoretical restrictions that made it meaningless on
grammatical grounds alone to talk about properties being, or not being,
properties of themselves. Montague followed Russell in adopting this sort
of solution, though the type-theoretical restrictions for his sense-denotation
intensional logic are based on Alonzo Churchs theory of simple types (sup-
plemented with a hierarchy of types for senses), rather than on Russells
theory of ramied types. Where Montague does not follow Russell in his de-
velopment of this logic, however, is in not adopting the no classestheory.
Instead, Montague applies type-theoretical restrictions to talk about classes
(or really sets as represented by their characteristic functions) as entities in
their own right, as well as to talk about properties and relations in intension
as senses of classes and relations in extension.
Now what is problematic about this is that the classes in Montagues
intensional logic are really sets or classes in the mathematical sense; i.e.,
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they are classes that are formed in accordance with the iterative concept of
set. This means that they are formed in accordance with the limitation-
of-size doctrine according to which sets are not to get too big too fast. In
this regard, Russells paradox is really inapplicable to sets since it assumes
a pattern of set-formation that violates the limitation-of-size doctrine and
therefore is not in accord with the iterative concept. Russells paradox in
its rst form, in other words, is really a paradox about classes in the logical
sense, and not about classes in the mathematical sense; that is, it is a paradox
about classes as the extensions of properties or concepts, where the latter are
based on predication and not on membership. This is why Russell found it
natural to avoid this form of his paradox by adopting his no classestheory.
Note that unlike sets or classes in the mathematical sense, which have
their being in their members, classes in the logical sense have their being in
the properties or concepts whose extensions they are. This di¤erence in on-
tological grounding is not vacuous, moreover, but is based on the di¤erence
between membership and predication, or rather on which of these two no-
tions is taken as fundamental. In Montagues intensional logic, for example,
membership in a set (as represented by its characteristic function) is funda-
mental, and the possession of a property, or monadic predication, is analyzed
as membership in the set denoted by that property. For example, where 
is a sense whose denotation is a set of entities of a given type, and  is an
entity of that type, then the possession by  of the property is dened
by Montague as follows (see [UG], p. 236 and [PTQ], p. 259):
fag =df [_]();
where [_]() says that the characteristic function of the set denoted by
 assigns 1 to , i.e., that  belongs to that set. Accordingly, because a
similar analysis is given for relational predication as well, it follows that
predication, whether monadic or relational, is not a fundamental logical form
in Montagues sense-denotation intensional logic but is dened in terms of
membership in a set.
Because membership in a set (as represented by the characteristic function
of that set), and not predication, is what is really fundamental in Montagues
intensional logic, then his way of avoiding Russells paradox of predication is
really a variant of his way of avoiding Russells paradox of membership. But
the latter, we have said, applies only to membership in a class in the logical
sense and is inapplicable to sets. Russells paradox in either form, in other
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words, is irrelevant to the kind of framework Montague has in mind in his
sense-denotation intensional logic. But then this leaves us without any real
motivation for adopting the type-theoretical restrictions Montague imposed
on this logic.1
Montagues rst intensional logic, on the other hand, is a logic in which
predication, and not membership, is fundamental; and in this case, once nom-
inalized predicates are allowed to occur as abstract singular terms, Russells
paradox is not irrelevant. Imposing type-theoretical restrictions on the forms
of predication in this logic, accordingly, is an understandable ploy as a way
of avoiding Russells paradox. It is noteworthy, moreover, that instead of
rejecting Russells no classestheory in his development of this logic, Mon-
tague actually formulated an alternative version of such a theory. A class,
for example, can be identied in this logic with a property that has the same
extension in every possible world, or what might be called a rigidproperty;
and an n-ary relation in extension can be similarly identied with an n-ary
rigid relation in intension. Rigidity in general (i.e., for each natural number
n) can be dened as follows (see Montague 1974, p. 132):
Rigid =df [F (8y1):::(8yn)(F (y1; :::; yn) _:F (y1; :::; yn))]:
On this analysis, accordingly, an n-ary relation-in-extension is simply a rigid
relation-in-intension, and a class in the logical sense is simply a rigid, prop-
erty. This notion of a class should not be confused with the mathematical
notion of a set.
The law of logic that we need on this analysis in order to account for our
talk of the extension of an arbitrary property or relation in intension is the
1Without type-restrictions, Montagues sense-denotation intensional logic would
amount in e¤ect to a rst-order set theory supplemented with a theory of senses in the
form of the sense- and denotation-forming operators ^ and _, respectively. That is, it
would then amount to an applied rst-order theory with 2 and ^ and _ as primitive
nonlogical constants. That might actually be preferable to Montagues own description
of ^ and _ as logical constants; for unlike quantiers and sentential connectives, these
operators have no counterparts in natural language, and the distinctions they are used to
articulate are more in the order of an applied theory of logical form than as fundamental
constituents of logical forms themselves. This is especially true of the hierarchy of senses
that is represented by iterated applications of ^. For what is represented in this hierarchy
is really not in the logical forms of the expressions of natural language, but is rather an
interpretation of the occurrence of these expressions in indirect discourse. On Montagues
theory, it is, after all, the same word or expression of natural language that is assigned
not only a direct sense but an indirect sense as well, and an indirect-indirect sense, and
so on ad innitum.
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following principle of rigidity (or what Gallin (1975, p. 77) calls the principle
of extensional comprehension):
(PR) (8F )(9G)(Rigidn(G) ^ (8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ G(x1; :::; xn)]):
Every property or relation-in-intension, in other words, is co-extensive with
a rigid property or relation-in-intension, and all talk of the extension of the
former can be analyzed as talk about the latter. Membership in a class
that is the extension of a given property, for example, is now analyzed in
terms of predication as the possession of a rigid property that is co-extensive
with that property. Thus, instead of predication being dened in terms of
membership in a set (as represented by the characteristic function of that set),
the way it is in Montagues sense-denotation intensional logic, membership in
a class is dened in Montagues higher-order modal predicate logic in terms
of predication.
One of the noteworthy consequences of (PR) is the commitment to pos-
sible worlds in the sense of world-propositions. That is, with (PR) as a basic
law of logic,
(9P )(P ^ (8Q)[(P ! Q) _(P ! :Q)])
is provable in higher-order modal predicate logic (see my 1986b, Section 11).
Given the above analysis of classes in the logical sense, we do not need to
rely on a set-theoretic semantics of so-called standard models as a guide to
the validity of the above thesis regarding the intensional existence of possible
worlds, i.e., the existence of possible worlds as world-propositions.
We should note here, however, that even though predication is fundamen-
tal in this logic, and membership is not, Montague himself follows the logic
as calculus view and interprets predication in terms of membership in his
set-theoretic semantics for this logic. In this way, standard models enter the
picture once again; indeed, with respect to such models, the above principle
of rigidity, (PR), is easily seen to be valid. But then, of course, with validity
dened in terms of standard models we obtain an incompleteness theorem
for this logic as well, in which case it too must fail as a candidate for the
view of logic as language. That is, insofar as the set-theoretic semantics of
standard models provides an adequate external critierion of validity for this
logic, then the fact that the logic is incomplete with respect to this semantics
shows that the latter provides more than merely a guide to validity; i.e., it
shows that the characterization of validity that it does provide cannot be
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eliminated in favor of an internal criterion in terms of the so-called laws of
logic.
The weak point in this argument for the view of logic as calculus is the as-
sumption that the standard-model set-theoretic interpretation of predication
in terms of membership provides an adequate external criterion of validity
for this logic. For it is this interpretation that begs the question as to which
is fundamental in this logic, predication or membership. In particular, by im-
posing an interpretation based on standard models, the classes in the logical
sense that are denable within the logic in terms of predication are reinter-
preted in e¤ect as sets (or rather as constant functions on possible worlds
having these sets as their constant values). That is, the notion of a class
in the logical sense is simply discarded on this interpretation in favor of the
iterative concept of set.
An alternative, of course, is the replacement of standard models in the
set-theoretic characterization of validity by general models, and in particular
by general models in which the cardinality of the values of the higher-order
predicate variables is no greater than that of the values of the rst-order
predicate variables. The latter restriction, needless to say, amounts to the
assumption that there are no more properties and relations in intension of
order n + 1 than there are of order n, for each positive integer n. The
contrary assumption that there must always be more properties and relations
in intension of order n + 1 than there are of order n is of course based on
Cantors theorem, which is the central feature of the iterative concept of
set; and therefore this assumes that the classes of properties and relations in
intension of order n+1 must all be sets or classes in the mathematical sense
of the iterative concept. But this simply begs the question at issue. For when
the classes in question are classes in the logical sense, and in particular when
they are merely rigid properties and relations-in-intension, then there is no
reason why their cardinalities must be in accord with the iterative concept of
set. Thus, once we reject the idea that classes in the logical sense are actually
sets or classes in the mathematical sense, then there is no reason why there
should be more second-order properties than there are rst-order properties,
or more third-order properties than second-order properties, etc. The type-
theoretical division of properties and relations in intension, as a division
designed to avoid Russells paradox, only divides properties and relations-in-
intension into di¤erent types not into types of di¤erent cardinalities.2
2It is noteworthy that Russell was led to the theory of types by considering Freges
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A completeness theorem is forthcoming with respect to this alternative
characterization of validity, and there ís no need to think of the set-theoretic
semantics of the general models in question as anything more than a guide
to validity. Strictly speaking, at least from the standpoint of the view of
logic as language, the guidance in this case is really in the opposite direc-
tion. For, in order to give the set-theoretic characterization of validity in
question, we actually need to rely on certain internal criteria (such as the
status of (PR) and the comprehension principle as schematically described
basic laws of logic) as constraints that must be imposed on the so-called non-
standard models in question. In other words, what makes the set-theoretic
characterization of validity adequate as an external criterion in this case is
its dependence on certain basic laws of logic from the internal point of view
of logic as language. Of course, given the completeness theorem, the set-
theoretic characterization of validity can be by-passed altogether in favor of
an axiomatic characterization.
Montagues rst intensional logic can serve, accordingly, as a candidate
for the view of logic as language, at least as far as the problem of a complete
axiomatization is concerned. There are other problems, however, including
in particular the objection that this sort of logic requires the use of circum-
locution or paraphrase in its analysis of the expressions of natural language.
But this objection can be overcome once we are given a precise translation
function that can be used as the basis of such an analysis. A strategy that
suggests itself here for obtaining such a translation for Montagues recur-
sively specied fragment of English is to use the product of two translation
functions, one translating Montagues sense-denotation intensional logic into
higher-order modal predicate logic, and the other translating the. fragment
of English in question into the sense-denotation intensional logic. That is,
given Montagues precise specication of the latter translation function, all
we need is a formal translation of Montagues sense-denotation intensional
logic into his higher-order modal predicate logic. Such a formal translation
function has in fact been described by Gallin (1975, Section 13), which means
hierarchy of unsaturated concepts (see my 1986b, Section 8). In this hierarchy (as I have
explained in my 1985, Section 2 and 1986b, Sections 4-5), the concepts of any given higher
level can be mapped into the concepts of the preceding level, just as rst-level concepts
can be mapped one-to-one with certain saturated objects called concept-correlates (or
Freges Wertverläufe, given his commitment to extensionality). There is no di¤erence in
cardinality, between the concepts of any one level and those of any other level of Freges
hierarchy.
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that we can put aside this objection to Montagues rst intensional logic as
a version of the view of logic as language.
There is another objection, however, that applies not only to Montagues
higher-order modal predicate logic, but to any theory of logical form that is
both based on type theory (of third- and higher-order) and proposed as a
version of the view of logic as language. In particular, as a framework for
conceptual analyses, such a theory imposes inappropriate restrictions on the
meaningful use of predicates in natural language. In general, for example,
it is meaningless in a theory of types for a nominalized predicate expression
to occur in the subject or argument position of another predicate unless
the latter can be assigned a higher type than the former; and therefore it
is meaningless for any predicate to occur in a nominalized form in its own
subject position. Thus, the otherwise unproblematic sentence of English,
The property of being a property is a property of itself, is by at ruled out
as meaningless, as is the sentence, Smith does not think that the property of
being philosophically interesting is itself philosophically interesting, even if
Jones does. Also ruled out in this way are otherwise unproblematic sentences
whose predicates apply to nominal expressions of di¤erent types, such as,
Jones thinks that some people are philosophically interesting, as well as
that some propositions, properties and relations-in-intension are too.
The rejection of these and many other meaningful sentences of English
is clearly a defect of any theory of logical form proposed as representing the
view of logic as language. It is one thing to divide up properties and relations-
in-intension as a way of avoiding Russells paradox of predication, and quite
another to make the meaningful use of predicates in natural language actually
depend on such a division. Fortunately, there is a way of achieving the one
result without also imposing the other, and it is noteworthy that this way
involves returning to the sort of framework that Frege and Russell advocated
at the turn of the century.
5 Second-Order Predicate Logic with
Nominalized Predicates
At the turn of the century, both Frege and Russell advocated the idea of
logic as language in a form that was in many respects very similar. Both
maintained that logic consisted of what today is called standard second
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order predicate logic, but supplemented to include a formal account of nom-
inalized predicates as well (see my 1986b paper for a defense of this claim).3
Of course, at that time only Frege had actually constructed a theory of logi-
cal form, and his formal account of nominalized predicates was given in his
theory of value-ranges (Werwerläufe), or what he also called classes in
the case of monadic predicates. This was because, unlike Russell, Frege was
an extensionalist, not an intensionalist. That is, Freges universals di¤er
only so far as their extensions are di¤erent(Posthumous Writings, p. 118),
whereas for Russell two universals could have the same extension (see my
1986b, Sections 11 and 13).
Freges theory of logical form is sometimes described as a second-order
set theory; but such a view is quite erroneous. For that view confuses sets
or classes in the mathematical sense of the iterative concept with classes in
the logical sense. That is, whereas a set, on the iterative concept, has its
being in its members, a class as the extension of a concept, according to
Frege, simply has its being in the concept, not in the objects which belong
to it([1979], p. 183). For Frege the logical forms of predication are more
fundamental than that of membership, and this is reected in the fact that
the latter is to be analyzed in terms of the former.
A more appropriate description of Freges theory is that it is a second-
order predicate logic with nominalized predicates. Originally, in his Begrifss-
chrift, Frege formulated as an axiom system essentially what today is called
standardsecond order predicate logic (with identity). It is clear that he
took this logic as providing a logical analysis of the forms of predication that
occur in natural language. Later, in his Grundgesetze, Frege added to this
logic his theory of value-ranges. This addition was not given as an applica-
tion of his earlier theory of logical form, it should be emphasized, but as a
further development of that theory. In particular, as I have argued in my
1986b article, Sections 45, the singular terms generated from formulas by
application of the smooth-breathing abstraction operator were interpreted
by Frege as symbolic counterparts of the abstract singular terms or noun
phrases generated in natural language by predicate nominalizations. These
nominalizations include not only such familiar patterns as F -ness, F -ity,
F -hoodand being an F, but also innitives, to F, and gerunds, F -ing,
3By standard second-order predicate logic, we do not mean standardas interpreted
with respect to so-called standardmodels of set theory. Rather, we mean the second-
order predicate that extends standard rst-order predicate logic by including a logic for
predicate quantiers that validates the full, impredicative comprehension principle.
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as well as Freges own favorite, the concept F. In other words, Frege viewed
the theory of logical forms he developed in the Grundgesetze as providing a
logical analysis not only of the predicate expressions that occur in natural
language, but also of the predicate nominalizations that occur therein as well.
Russells conception of logic at the turn of the century was also essentially
that of a second-order predicate logic with nominalized predicates, though
unlike Frege his account of this logic was presented very informally. (See my
1980 and 1986b articles for a description of Russells early views.) Russell
di¤ered from Frege, however, not only in assuming an intensional theory of
universals, but also in maintaining that nominalized predicates denote as
singular terms the same entities that predicates otherwise stand for in their
role as predicates. Russell rejected, in other words, the Fregean view that
universals have an unsaturated nature of their own corresponding to the
unsaturated nature of predicates in their role as predicates (1986b, Section
1).
Now we shall not be concerned here with the details of either Freges
or Russells early views on the nature of logic, having already covered that
ground in my 1980 and 1986b articles. But, we do want to note and em-
phasize that what is common to both Frege and early Russell is the idea
of second-order predicate logic with nominalized predicates as a paradigm
of the view of logic as language. Here we have all of the essentials of what
constitutes a theory of logical form as an expression of that view; namely,
basic forms of predication, propositional connectives, quantiers that reach
into predicate as well as subject positions, and nominalized predicates as ab-
stract singular terms. These all correspond to fundamental aspects of natural
language, and to attempt to do without any of them in a theory of logical
form would leave those aspects of natural language unexplained. Of course,
these are precisely the features that constitute type-theoretical higher-order
predicate logic, except that in the latter predicates are grammatically divided
into di¤erent types, with the constraint on well-formedness that nominalized
predicates can occur as subject (or argument) expressions only of predicates
of higher types. This su¢ ces as a way of avoiding Russells paradox, because
the grammatical division imposes a logical division as well. But it turns out
that the logical point of the theory of types can be made without the gram-
matical restrictions, and because the latter impose inappropriate constraints
on the meaningful use of predicates in natural language, it is much to be de-
sired that we can make the logical point, and avoid Russells paradox, without
also imposing the grammatical restrictions. What is signicant is that this
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can be done by returning to the original context out of which type theory
arose, namely, second-order predicate logic with nominalized predicates as
abstract singular terms. We can return, in other words, to the paradigm of
the view of logic as language.
We can briey describe this paradigm as follows, where, for convenience,
we take !, :, =, 8, , and  as primitive logical constants and assume
the others to be dened in the usual way. We assume the availability of
denumerably many individual variables, and, for each natural number n,
denumerably many n-place predicate variables. (Propositional variables are
taken as 0-place predicate variables.) We will use x, y, z, with or without
numerical subscripts, to refer to individual variables, and F n;Gn;Rnto
refer to n-place predicate variables. (Usually we drop the superscript when
the context makes clear the number of subject positions that go with a pred-
icate variable.) Complex predicates will all be generated from formulas by
means of the -operator. Note that although predicates are not themselves
singular terms, they can be transformed into such by deletion of the subject
(argument) positions that come with them in their role as predicates. Tradi-
tionally, this transformation is marked by a deletion of the parentheses (and
commas in the case of a relational predicate) that precede and succeed (or
separate in the case of commas) the singular terms to which the predicate
can be applied. We shall retain this traditional practice here. For example,
on the denition that is to follow, F (x) and R(x; y) are formulas in which F
and R occur as predicates, but G(F ) and G(R) are formulas in which F and
R occur as singular terms. In F (F ) and R(F;R), of course, F and R occur
both as predicates and as singular terms (though no single occurrence can be
both as a predicate and as a singular term). As indicated, we shall require
predicates to be accompanied by parentheses (and commas) only when they
actually occur in a formula as a predicate.
In the denition that is to follow we use 0 to represent the type of a
singular term, 1 the type of a formula, and n + 1, for n > 0, the type of
an n-place predicate expression. For each natural number n, accordingly, we
recursively dene the meaningful expressions of type n, in symbols MEn, as
follows:
1. Every individual variable or constant is in ME0, and every n-place
predicate variable or constant is in both MEn+1, and ME0;
2. if a; b 2ME0, then (a = b) 2ME1;
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3. if  2MEn+1 and a1; :::; an 2ME0, then (a1; :::; a) 2ME1;
4. if ' 2 ME1, and x1; :::; xn are pairwise distinct individual variables,
then [x1; :::xn'] 2MEn+1;
5. if ' 2ME1, then :' 2ME1;
6. if ';  2ME1, then ('!  ) 2ME1;
7. if ' 2ME1, and a is an individual or a predicate variable, then (8a)' 2
ME1;
8. if ' 2ME1; then ['] 2ME0; and
9. if n > 1, then MEn ME0.
Note that by clause (9) every predicate expression (without its accom-
panying parentheses and commas) is a singular term. This includes 0-place
predicate expressions, but not formulas in general. To nominalize a formula,
however, we need only apply clause (8). Thus, we may read [']when it
occurs as a singular term as that '. Note also that although only individ-
ual variables are bound by the -operator, we can dene its application to
arbitrary variables a1; :::; an as follows:
[a1; :::; an'] =df [x1;:::; xn(9a1):::(9an)(x1 = a1 ^ ::: ^ xn = an ^ ')];
where x1; :::; xn do not occur free in '.
In regard to the laws of logic as understood in the original context of
this paradigm, we need only take the axioms and rules of standardsecond-
order predicate logic, but applied now to all formulas, including those with
as well as those without nominalized predicates among their singular terms
(1986b, Section 3).4 Because we include  as a logical primitive, we can
add to these axioms and rules those of the S5 modal propositional logic as
well. Of course, Russells paradox is now derivable as a consequence of the
following instance of the comprehension principle:
(9F )([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x)] = F ):
4See our earlier note on our use of standardwith respect to second-order predicate
logic.
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But instead of following Russell and avoiding the paradox by imposing type-
theoretical restrictions on the meaningful use of predicates, we can avoid the
paradox by simply imposing the lesser grammatical constraint of excluding
all -abstracts that are not homogeneously stratied.5 (See my 1986b arti-
cle, Section 9, for an explanation of why heterogeneous stratication is not
restrictive enough.) This still allows for the meaningfulness of F (F ) and
:F (F ), or even of [x']([x']), so long as [x'] is homogeneously strati-
ed. Note however that since the -abstract involved in Russells paradox is
not homogeneously stratied, it is excluded by this weaker grammatical con-
straint as not being well-formed. This means that the original comprehension
principle,
(CP) (9F n)([x1; :::xn'] = F );
where F does not occur free in ', is now restricted to what we shall call the
homogeneously stratied comprehension principle (HSCP).
Except for the restriction to homogeneously stratied -abstracts, it should
be emphasized, everything in the original context of our paradigmatic second-
order predicate logic with nominalized predicates remains as it was. We call
this system HST (or just HST if  is dropped as a logical constant).
In my 1986, it is shown that HST is consistent if weak Zermelo set the-
ory is consistent, and also that it is equiconsistent with the theory of simple
types.
It is noteworthy that even the restriction to homogeneously stratied -
abstracts can be dropped in favor of the original grammar of our paradigm
if we modify instead the standard rst-order logic that was also part of that
paradigm and allow for denotationless singular terms; that is, if we switch to a
rst-order logic that is free of existential presuppositions. In this way we can
retain the original comprehension principle (CP), including the instance
involved in Russells paradox, but note that all that follows by Russells
5A formula or -abstract ' is homogeneously stratied i¤ there is an assignment t of
natural numbers to the set of terms and predicate expressions occurring in ' such that
(1) for all terms a; b, if (a = b) occurs in ', then t(a) = t(b); (2) for all n > 1, all n-
place predicate expressions  and all terms a1; :::; an, if (a1; :::; an) occurs in ', then (i)
t(aj) = t(ak), for 1  j; k  n, and (ii) t() = t(a1) + 1; (3) for all natural numbers m,
all individual variables x1; :::; xm, and all formulas  , if [x1; :::xm ] occurs in ', then
(iii) t(xj) = t(xk), for 1  j; k  m, and (iv) t([x1; :::xm ]) = t(x1) + 1; and (4) for all
formulas  if [] occurs in ', and a1; :::; ak are all the terms or predicates occurring in
, then t()  max[t(a1); :::; t(ak)].
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argument is that
:(9y)([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = y)
is now provable. This does not contradict
(9F )([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = F )
as an instance of (CP), but only requires that we distinguish the role of
[x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] as a predicate from its role as a singular term.
Russells contention that nominalized predicates denote as singular terms the
same entities that predicates otherwise stand for in their role as predicates
must be rejected, and something like Freges original contention of a dis-
tinction between unsaturated concepts and saturated objects retained (see
my 1986b, Section 17, for an interpretation of this distinction di¤erent from
Freges). All of the properties and relations denoted by singular terms in
HST can be retained, however, by adding to our modied context a
special axiom (9/HSCP) to that e¤ect 1986b, Section 15 and 1985, Sec-
tion 7). We call the resulting system HST (or just HST

 if  is dropped
as a primitive logical constant). In my 1986 it is shown that HST is
equiconsistent with HST, and therefore with the theory of simple types
as well.
Both HST andHST, it should be emphasized, are reconstructions
of the original context of our paradigm. Both, in their own way, make the
logical point of the theory of types, but without also imposing the grammat-
ical restrictions of the latter. This logical point was actually already present
in Frege in his hierarchy of unsaturated concepts and was taken over by Rus-
sell in his attempt to avoid his paradox (1986b, Section 8). In this regard
we are not really changing the original context of our paradigm so much as
correcting the way that properties and relations are to be posited in that
paradigm.
We should also note here thatHST has been used in Montague gram-
mar by Gennaro Chierchia in place of Montagues own sense-denotation in-
tensional logic, and that in fact Chierchia has shown HST to be a better
semantical framework over all known alternatives as a way of explaining a
variety of issues in linguistics (see Chierchia 1984, 1985). This application
of HST has involved the construction of a precise translation function
from English into HST, and, as a result, the objection that a conceptual
analysis of natural language in terms of HST requires the use of circum-
locution and paraphrase is without force. Since such a translation will apply
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to HST as well, these results indicate how either system can be taken as
a reconstruction of our original paradigmatic view of logic as language.
Finally, let us note that the principle of rigidity, (PR), formulated earlier
for higher-order modal predicate logic is also well formed in HST and
HST. Adding (PR) to either of these systems implies the existence of
possible worlds in the sense of world-propositions, just as it does in higher-
order modal predicate logic. But there is another sense of the notion of a
possible world now available as well; namely, the notion of a possible world as
a maximal classof compossible facts. Thus, where facts are dened as true
propositions (or as what true propositional forms denote when nominalized),
i.e., where
Fact =df [x(9P )(x = P ^ P )];
and a class in the logical sense is just a rigid, property, this notion of a
possible world can be dened as follows:
Poss-Wld2 =df [x(9F )(x = F ^Rigid1(F ) ^ (8y)[F (y)$ Fact(y)])]:
Now just as (PR) implies the existence of possible worlds in the sense of
world-propositions, so too (PR) in either of our reconstructed systems im-
plies the existence of possible worlds in the sense of maximal classes of
compossible facts. That is,
(9F )(Poss-Wld2(F ) ^ (8y)[F (y)$ Fact(y)])
is provable on the basis of (PR) in either of these systems. We should note
here that none of these results depends on the problematic view of properties
and relations in intension as being identical when necessarily co-extensive.
That is, the principle of intensionality,
(8x1)::(8xn)('$  )! [x1:::xn'] = [x1:::xn ];
need not be taken as a basic law of logic in either of these reconstructions of
our original paradigm of the view of logic as language.
6 A Set-Theoretic Semantics with Predica-
tion as Fundamental
As reconstructions of the original paradigm of the view of logic as language,
both HST and HST take predication, and not membership, as fun-
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damental. This is a feature we should retain, accordingly, even in the set-
theoretic semantics we shall construct for these systems. Indeed, as we will
see, with predication given its own special representation within a semantic
structure, the distinction between standard and nonstandard models becomes
void, which is as it should be since the classes we want to represent in these
structures are classes in the logical sense.
One of the notions that we will use in this semantics is the idea of a
Fregean correlation between the entities that predicates stand for in their
role as predicates and the objects or individuals that are denoted by their
nominalizations when they occur as abstract singular terms. We do not
preclude the possibility that this correlation is the identity function on the
entities in question, however; that is, the semantics is neutral between a
Fregean and a Russellian interpretation of nominalized predicates. The se-
mantics is neutral in other respects as well, as we shall see, but these other
features will not concern us here. (See my 1978 for a fuller discussion of the
issue of a semantics that is neutral between competing versions of logic as
language.)
Because the semantics we describe here is a modalized and Fregean mod-
ication of John Simmss (1980) semantics, we will refer to the semantic
structures in question as modal S-structures. (The present version of this
semantics was rst given in my (1986, Chap. 6) and another, slightly dif-
ferent, version was given in my (1978, Section 11).) Accordingly, where
A = hDn; En; Hi; fiin2!;i2W , we will say that A is a modal S-structure if
and only if
1. En  Dn, for all n 2 !;
2. Dm+1 \Dn+1 = 0, for all m;n 2 ! such that m 6= n;
3. for i 2 W , Hi  [n2!(Dn+1  (D0)n);
4. for i 2 W , Fi is a function from [n2!Dn into D0 such that for all
d 2 E0, fi(d) = d; and
5. for n 2 !, W and Dn are not empty.
By way of explanation, think ofthe members of W as possible worlds and
the sets Dn and En as the ranges, respectively, of the free and the bound vari-
ables of type n. Then, what clause (1) requires is that all values of the bound
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variables of type n are also values of the free variables of type n, for all n 2 !.
Structures in which En is a proper subset of Dn are free of existential presup-
positions regarding expressions of type n. However, because in our present
context we want the comprehension principle of either HST or HST
to be externally valid, we will exclude those structures in which Dn 6= En,
for n > 0. Note, however, that in HST singular terms are free of existen-
tial presuppositions, and therefore in the structures characterizing validity in
HST E0 is a proper subset of D0. In HST, on the other hand, singu-
lar terms, including nominalized predicates, are posited as always denoting,
and therefore in structures characterizing validity in HST, E0 = D0.
These di¤erences between the structures characterizing set-theoretic valid-
ity for HST, as opposed to those characterizing set-theoretic validity
for HST are determined by criteria internal to these systems as separate
versions of the view of logic as language.
What clause (2) in our denition of a modal S-structure requires is that
no m-ary universal is an n-ary universal if m 6= n, and this of course is as
it should be. Where i 2 W , clause (3) describes the set-theoretic relation
that we are to think ofas predication with respect to i. Thus, in partic-
ular, we are to think of the rst component of the ordered pairs in this
relation as an n-ary universal (a member of Dn+1), for some n 2 !, and
the second component as an n-tuple drawn from the domain of individuals.
There is nothing in this description, it should be emphasized, that involves
interpreting predication at i as membership; that is, there is no presumption
that the relation in question has any similarity at all to membership (of an
n-tuple) in a set. Of course, in general, relative to the internal criteria of
a given theory of logical form as a version of the view of logic as language,
including especially the comprehension principle that is internally valid in
such a theory, the relation representing predication at a given possible world
will have a more determinate structure than is described in clause (3); and
because it is determined by the laws of logic of the theory in question, this
more determinate structure will remain invariant across all possible worlds,
even though the particular relation assigned to predication at one possible
world will in general be di¤erent from that assigned at another. This latter
feature, i.e., that di¤erent relations may be assigned to predication at dif-
ferent possible worlds, is a consequence of the essential indexical nature of
predication. That predication is essentially indexical, and not timelessor
worldless, as is sometimes claimed, explains why the same property can
be predicated of di¤erent objects at di¤erent possible worlds (or at di¤er-
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ent times in the same possible world), whereas a set, having its being in its
members, cannot have di¤erent members at di¤erent possible worlds (or at
di¤erent times in the same world).
Finally, where i 2 W , the function fi is to be our Fregean correlation
at i of universals with individual objects. We allow this correlation to be
indexical, i.e., to vary at di¤erent possible worlds, only in the semantics that
is neutral between alternative theories. For example, in a modal counterpart
of Freges theory, a nominalized predicate is interpreted as denoting at a given
possible world the class that is the extension at that world of the universal
otherwise assigned to that predicate. But since the same universal will in
general have di¤erent extensions at di¤erent possible worlds, it follows that
a nominalized predicate may denote di¤erent objects at di¤erent possible
worlds. In other words,
(9F )(9G)(F = G ^ F 6= G)
is consistent in such a modal Fregean framework (1986b, Section 16). In
HST and HST, however, Leibnizs law is valid in its unrestricted
form, and as a consequence, for all i; j 2 W , fi = fj. A modal S-structure
where this holds is said to be rigid. As indicated, set-theoretic validity for
HST or HST will be dened only with respect to rigid modal S-
structures that satisfy the basic laws of logic of such a system. (Some princi-
ples will be valid in all rigid modal S-structures. These are the principles of
the minimal system M described in my 1986 (Chap. 5 and 1978, Section
10.)
We will forego the details here of the denition of satisfaction in a modal
S-structure at a given possible world (1986, Section 6.5). We should note,
however, that unlike the situation in the usual set-theoretic semantics for
second and higher-order predicate logic (where predication is interpreted as
membership), this denition in no way depends on either the notion of a
standard model that is full(in the sense of the iterative concept of set), or
of a nonstandard model that, if not full, is at least closed under conditions
that enable us to assign semantic values to complex expressions. Indeed,
with predication taken as fundamental in our semantics as well as our syn-
tax, there is no basis at all for the kind of distinction that obtains between
standard and nonstandard models when predication is interpreted as mem-
bership. For with predication as fundamental, n-ary universals are no longer
analyzed or represented by functions from possible worlds to sets of n-tuples,
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but are rather directly represented in the same way that possible worlds and
individuals are. This cuts the ground completely from the kind of incom-
pleteness theorem that is generated with respect to the so-called standard
models of higher-order logic; and this is as it should be, for reasons already
explained, when it is intended that predication, and not membership, be
taken as fundamental in the higher-order logic in question. It also cuts the
ground from the idea that properties and relations-in-intension are identical
when they have the same extension in every possible world.
Finally, it should be emphasized that except for a certain minimal system
of principles that are valid in all (rigid) modal S-structures, a completeness
theorem is not forthcoming for a system such as HST or HST except
by restricting the S-structures to those in which the basic laws of the system
are valid. (A formula is valid in an S-structure if it is true in all possible
worlds of that structure.) This is not because these systems are incomplete
otherwise, but rather because it is only by excluding certain S-structures
that we can give a set-theoretical (or really mathematical) representation of
the additional content of the basic laws of logic that are valid in these systems
over and above those of the minimal system. In other words, on the view
of logic as language, where predication and not membership is fundamental,
the set-theoretical denition of validity for a system such as HST or
HST provides a strictly external and extrinsic criterion that in no way is
essential to the notion of validity that is internal to this system. The real
content of our logic, on this view, is not our set theory, but in the logic itself
as a formal theory of predication.
7 Concluding Remarks
The account we have given here of the view of logic as language should not
be taken as a rejection of the set-theoretical approach or as defense of the
metaphysics of possibilist logical realism. Rather, our view is that there are
really two types of conceptual framework corresponding to our two doctrines
of the nature of logic. The rst type of framework is based on membership
in the sense of the iterative concept of set; and although extensionality is its
most natural context (because sets have their being in their members), it may
nevertheless be extended to include intensional contexts by way of a theory
of senses (as in Montagues sense-denotation intensional logic). The second
type of framework is based on predication; and in certain developments it
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can be associated with one or another theory of universals. Extensionality
is not the most natural context in this theory, but where it does hold and
extensions are posited, the extensions are classes in the logical and not in the
mathematical sense.
Russells paradox, as we have explained, has no real bearing on set-
formation in a theory of membership based on the iterative concept of set,
but it does bear directly on concept-formation or the positing or universals in
a theory based on predication. As a result, our second type of framework has
usually-been thought to be incoherent or philosophically bankrupt, leaving
us with the set-theoretical approach as the only viable alternative. That is
why so much of analytic philosophy in the 20th Century has been dominated
by the set-theoretical approach. Set theory, after all, does seem to serve the
purposes of a mathesis universalis.
What is adequate as a mathesis universalis, however, need not therefore
also be adequate as a lingua philosophica or characteristica universalis. In
particular, the set-theoretic approach does not seem to provide a philosoph-
ically satisfying semantics for natural language; this is because it is pred-
ication and not membership that is fundamental to natural language. An
adequate semantics for natural language, in other words, seems to demand a
conceptual framework based on predication and not on membership.
It has been our contention here that Russells paradox has not really nul-
lied the second type of conceptual framework, i.e., one based on predication.
And in fact we have shown that one can return to Freges and Russells orig-
inal paradigm of second-order predicate logic with nominalized predicates as
a coherent and philosophically useful theory of predication. Being based on
predication, this framework is not subject to the incompleteness problem the
way a theory of membership is. In addition, we do not need to resort to
circumlocution or paraphrase in the application of this framework to natural
language. To be sure, we have described this framework, and motivated our
discussion throughout, primarily in terms of logical realism as its associated
theory of universals, i.e., with propositions, properties and relations in inten-
sion as the basic entities involved in predication, and with possible worlds
as either certain kinds of propositions or certain kinds of properties. We
have done so because this ontology, together with a commitment to possible
individuals, seems to be implicit in natural language. But we do not mean
to claim that this is the only theory of universals, or that HST and
HST with or without (PR), the principle of rigidity, are the only formal
theories of predication that can provide an adequate semantics for natural
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language. In other words, there are other theories of universals, as well as
other formal theories of predication, and only a comparison of their strengths
and weaknesses will help us to decide which we should adopt as a framework
for natural language. (It is this sort of study that I have initiated in my
(1986) book and my 1988 article.)
We do not maintain, accordingly, that we should give up the set-theoretic
approach, especially when dealing with the philosophy and foundations of
mathematics, or that only a theory of predication associated with possibilist
logical realism will provide an adequate semantics for natural language. In
both cases we may nd a principle of tolerance, if not outright pluralism, the
more appropriate attitude to take.
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